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Abstract
Theoretically, the effect on investment of uncertainty over the demand for a firm’s
product may be unclear because of the influence of several factors, such as the production
technology and the amount of competition in the product market. It has not been possible,
until now, to investigate more closely the interplay of different factors in the time dimension
because  the  empirical  research  has  been  based  on  cross-section  analysis.  This  omission
makes biased estimates of the investment-uncertainty relationship likely. The aim of this
paper is to extend the findings of the empirical literature using a panel of Italian firms in the
period 1996-2004, covering a complete business cycle. The availability of panel survey data
on companies’ investment plans, expected future sales and demand uncertainty allows us to
account for unobservable individual differences between firms, macroeconomic shocks and
the  evolution  of  the  investment-uncertainty  relationship.  A  key  finding  of  our  paper
concerns the role of the competition encountered by Italian firms in 1996-2004. The gradual
loss of market power over time of Italian manufacturing firms, along with the increasing
flexibility  of  labour  input  may  have  weakened  the  negative  effect  of  uncertainty  on
investment decisions. We show that, in repeated cross-section estimates, the omission of
firm-specific effects together with the dynamic interplay described above, would have lead
to  misleading  conclusions  about  the  relevance  of  demand  uncertainty  in  explaining
investment decisions.
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1. Introduction 
1
In  the  last  thirty  years,  debate  about  the  investment-uncertainty  relationship  has
flourished.  The  reason  for  such  interest  lies  primarily  in  the  difficulty  of  deriving
unequivocal conclusions about the sign and relevance of this relationship.
According to Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983, 1985) the effect of uncertainty on
investment decisions is positive, or at least non-negative, for firms operating under perfect
competition, with a constant return to scale (CRS) technology and a symmetric adjustment-
cost  function  for  capital.  With  the  additional  assumption  of  costlessly  adjustable  labour
input, it can be shown that the marginal value of capital is a convex function of prices. In a
stochastic context, an increase in uncertainty raises the value of investment, and therefore of
investment expenditure, irrespective of the assumption on the investment-cost function.
Following  the  analyses  of  Bernanke  (1983)  and  Mc  Donald  and  Siegel  (1986),
Bertola (1988) and Pindyck (1988) demonstrate that in a monopolistic and stochastic setting
an  increase  in  uncertainty  over  the  evolution  of  demand  reduces  investment  via  an
irreversibility effect. The basic concept is that of the “perpetual call option” value of an
investment plan: with greater uncertainty the value of the option to postpone investment
increases (in order to wait for new information) so that the decision to invest is delayed. In
other  words,  an  irreversible  investment  entails  an  opportunity  cost  increasing  with
uncertainty.
According  to  Caballero  (1991;  see  also  Abel  and  Eberly,  1994,  1996,  1997)  the
crucial hypothesis is not the irreversibility of the capital goods used by the firm, but the
hypothesis  on  the  structure  of  the  product  market:  for  a  competitive  firm  with  a  CRS
technology, even under irreversibility of capital goods the Hartmann-Abel approach may
prevail, thus generating a non-negative relationship between investment and uncertainty.
This is due to the fact that with perfect competition the marginal revenue product of capital
does not depend on the capital stock: current investment thus has no effect on the future
profitability  of  the  firm  and  the  firm  never  has  a  reason  to  disinvest.  Under  imperfect
competition  the  marginal  profitability  of  capital  depends  on  the  level  of  capital  via  the
                                                          
1 Paper presented at the 28
th CIRET Conference on Cyclical Indicators and Economic Policy Decisions (Rome,
20-23 September 2006) and at the 2
nd Italian Congress of Econometrics and Empirical Economics (Rimini, 25-
26 January 2007). Many thanks are due to G. Bertola, P. Cipollone, L. Fanelli, A. Golan, F. Lotti, M. Magnani,
J. Mairesse, A. Rosolia, F. Schivardi, U. Trivellato, J. Wooldridge, G. Zevi, an anonymous referee for helpful
comments. The usual caveats apply. Financial support from MIUR is gratefully acknowledged (R. Golinelli).
The views contained here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions for
which they work.4
product  demand  function  and  given  (asymmetrical)  irreversibility:  ’having  too  much  of
capital is “worse” than having too little of it since increasing the stock of capital is cheaper
than decreasing it’ (Caballero, 1991, p. 286).
Pindyck  (1993),  however,  shows  that  the  irreversibility  effect  may  nevertheless
prevail even for firms adopting a CRS technology and facing perfect competition: in this
case it is necessary to consider explicitly the effects of industry-wide demand uncertainty on
the equilibrium of a competitive industry (in this context Sakellaris, 1994, shows that the
relevant point is the elasticity of demand; more specifically, he shows that the irreversibility
effect dominates for firms with an inelastic demand curve; see also Caballero and Pyndick,
1996).
In an attempt to shed light on the ambiguity of the uncertainty effect, Lee and Shin
(2000) consider more explicitly the role of labour input. They show that the variability of
labour tends to ‘convexify’ the firm profit function so that uncertainty may raise investment.
The intuition of this result is that the variability of one production factor can compensate for
the irreversibility of the other (see also Eberly and Van Mieghem, 1997).
Even from this very concise overview of the literature it appears that the shape of the
investment-uncertainty  relationship  depends  crucially  on  the  interplay  of  the  different
hypotheses about the degree of competition in the product market and the technological
characteristics of the production function and of its inputs.
2 This leaves much room for
empirical analysis in measuring the consequences of the assumptions on the features of the
firm’s capital goods, the elasticity of demand and, more generally, the technology (with
particular emphasis on the role of the labour input). This is what we try to do in this paper.
A  general  result  of  the  empirical  literature  is  that  the  effect  of  uncertainty  on
investment decisions is negative and significant (see Carruth et al., 2000, for a review, and
more recently, Greasley and Madsen, 2006). However, as much of the literature is based on
aggregate data it is difficult to find a proper assessment of the role played by the different
assumptions about firm characteristics. Moreover, even in empirical analyses at micro level
(see for example Leahy and Whited, 1996), the absence of suitable data, with information on
irreversibility,  market  power  etc.,  has  prevented  a  much  deeper  investigation  of  firms’
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behaviour (a partial exception is Chirinko and Scaller, 2004, who present estimates of the
importance of irreversibility for a panel of American firms).
One of the main problems faced by empirical analyses is the absence of a reliable
measure of uncertainty. The great variety of proxies proposed in the literature may at least
partly  explain  the  rather  inconclusive  evidence  about  the  nature  of  the  investment-
uncertainty  relationship.  A  possible  solution  to  this  problem  is  to  derive  a  measure  of
uncertainty directly from entrepreneurs, by exploiting self-reports of expectations elicited in
the  form  of  subjective  probabilities  (see  Mansky,  2004,  for  a  theoretical  analysis  of
expectation measurement in economics).
Guiso  and  Parigi  (1996,  1999)  were  the  first  to  use  subjective  probabilities  to
quantify the uncertainty surrounding the expected evolution of demand faced by a firm.
Using the rich database of the Survey on Investments in Manufacturing (SIM), conducted
annually by the Bank of Italy, they provide evidence on the link between uncertainty and
investment  and,  above  all,  on  the  role  played  by  irreversibility  and  by  the  degree  of
competition in the product market. In particular, they show that the uncertainty effect is
negative and becomes stronger the higher is the degree of irreversibility and the greater the
firm’s market power.
3
However, Guiso and Parigi’s empirical investigation is limited to the cross-section
dimension and therefore their results may be distorted by the omission of other explanatory
variables in both the individual and the time dimension and/or by the possible presence of
selection biases in the sub-samples used to assess the effect of uncertainty for high/low
reversibility and market power.
These limitations can be circumvented by the use of panel data: in our paper, thanks
to the availability of a sample of Italian manufacturing firms observed in the period 1996-
2004  (covering  a  complete  business  cycle:  the  expansion  from  1996  to  2000  and  the
recession  in  the  following  four  years)  we  can  account  for  unobservable  individual
differences between firms (such as risk aversion) and for more aggregate (industry-wide
and/or macroeconomic) shocks. We also compute some econometric tests for the presence
of selection biases in the analysis of the effects of reversibility, market power and labour
flexibility. Finally, the availability of panel data allows us to better track the evolution of the
uncertainty-investment  relationship  over  time.  The  estimation  in  repeated  cross-sections
reveals a dynamic pattern of the uncertainty parameter estimates, which seem to have a
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positive trend, and in the last two years of the sample it is not significantly different from
zero. This means that the cross-section estimates computed for the initial and final years of
the period would have given opposite insights into the investment-uncertainty relationship.
Longitudinal data circumvent this problem: they allow us to frame the analysis in the more
general dynamic context by exploiting the information about variability over time. We have
therefore been able to account properly for the evolution of the Italian manufacturing sector
in a period of deep changes at both the institutional and the technological level.
The  results  of  our  analysis  are  twofold:  on  one  side  they  confirm  the  previous
findings of the empirical literature; on the other, they contain new and original evidence on
some characteristics of the investment-uncertainty relationship. In the first case, we show
that  the  link  between  demand  uncertainty  and  investment  decisions  is  fundamentally
negative (a reduction of uncertainty from the third to the first quartile of its distribution
implies an increase of 1.3 per cent in investments) and that the effect of uncertainty seems to
be  stronger  for  the  firms  that  employ  more  irreversible  capital  goods  and/or  operate  in
markets with a lower degree of competition.
In the second case, we provide some evidence on the role of the flexibility of labour
input and the evolution over time of the investment-uncertainty relationship. We show that
the effect of uncertainty on investment plans seem to weaken for firms that can employ a
more flexible labour input, a result that is consistent with the theoretical analysis of Eberly
and Van Mieghem (1997) and Lee and Shin (2000). Moreover, our findings seem to support
the hypothesis that the investment decision process in Italian manufacturing firms has been
deeply influenced by the increase in competition during the period under scrutiny.
A number of factors may lie behind this evolution. First, the adoption of the euro has
definitely prevented the ‘competitive devaluations’ of the lira that occurred frequently in the
past, helping Italian firms to counteract competition on foreign markets. Second, the fast and
contemporaneous development of new industrialized countries (such as China and India) has
exerted  strong  competitive  pressures  especially  in  low-technology  sectors  where  Italian
firms are traditionally specialized. Third, in the last ten years the functioning of the labour
market has been significantly altered to achieve greater flexibility in the use of the labour
input. All in all, these events seem to suggest a general shift towards an environment more
similar to the stylized model underlying the Hartman-Abel approach.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the theoretical model
used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the main features of our data and computes
preliminary cross-section estimates of the relationship of interest. Section 4 reports baseline7
estimation results over the full sample and a number of variants to assess their robustness.
Section 5 focusses on the estimates of the model in sub-samples selected on the basis of
different  degrees  of  irreversibility  of  the  installed  capital,  of  market  competition  and  of
labour flexibility. The issue of the stability over time of the parameter estimates is assessed
in Section 6, especially in relation to the evolution of the degree of competition (measured
by the price-cost margin). Section 7 contains some general comments on the results. In
addition, Appendix A1 gives details of data sources, definitions and representativeness, and
Appendix A2 reports estimation results using realised instead of planned investments.
2. The model
The empirical model used for estimation is a panel version of that proposed in Guiso
and Parigi (1996, 1999) and is based on the idea that investment decision is irreversible and
that the demand threshold triggering investment rises with uncertainty. Abel and Eberly
(1994, 1996, and 1997) show that the optimal trigger point is equal to the user cost of capital
adjusted to account for irreversibility and uncertainty. In particular, uncertainty raises the
value of the user cost and so reduces the responsiveness to demand of both the decision to
invest  and  the  amount  of  the  investment.  Let 
g / 1 ) / (
- = y K a mvp   be  the  marginal  value
product of capital evaluated at the current level of the stock of capital,  K , and of demand y;
a is a constant and  0 1 < < g  a parameter. Let c(u) be the user cost of capital which, under
irreversibility, is positively influenced by uncertainty about future demand, u.
With no adjustment costs and ignoring depreciation, the firm’s optimal capital stock
is  K y c u a
* ( ( ) / ) =
-g   and  the  corresponding  investment  policy  is:  0
* > - = K K I   if
) (u c mvp >   or  K y c u a <
- ( ( ) / )
g .  When  ) (u c mvp £ ,  or  K y c u a ³
- ( ( ) / )
g ,  investment
should be zero. This case is a natural test of the irreversibility theory but it is very difficult to
implement because of the extreme rarity of observations with zero investment (lower than 3
per cent of the total number of our observations). This occurs especially when using data on
total investment, which is an aggregate of different types of capital goods, such as structures,
equipment  and  so  on:  firms  may  plan  zero  investment  in  structures  as  well  as  positive
investment  in  other  categories.
4  However,  the  virtual  absence  of  zero-investment
                                                          
4 Bloom et al. (2003, 2007) studies the irreversibility theory with aggregation effects. Guiso and Parigi (1999)
present  some  estimates  for  three  different  types  of  capital  goods,  equipment,  structures  and  vehicles,
confirming  the results  obtained for  the  total  aggregate;  more  recently,  Bontempi  et  al.  (2004)  extend  the
fundamental q approach to the case of two capital inputs: equipment and structures.8
observations  should  not  alter  the  relationship  between  uncertainty  and  the  user  cost  of
capital that is at the root of our analysis of investment decisions.
We therefore concentrate on the case  ) (u c mvp > , so that  K y c u a
* ( ( ) / ) =
-g . In this
context and with panel data, the investment rate can be shown to be a function of demand,
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where subscripts i and t respectively indicate the i
th company (i = 1, 2, …, N) and the year t
(t  =  1,  2,  …,  T). it K is  the  stock  of  capital  measured  at  the  end  of  t;  1 it t I +   and  it I
respectively  represent  the  investment  planned  at  year  t  for  the  following  year  and  the
realised investment in t;  1 it tY +  is the level of demand expected at the end of year t for the
following year;  ( ) 1 it tY u +  represents the firm’s uncertainty about demand in t+1 as perceived
in t. All previous variables are measured at constant prices.  it Z  is a vector of additional
controls to account for exceptional events, such as extraordinary operations, and  1 + it e  is the
stochastic error term referring to investment plans in t+1. Fixed effects  i a  and  t l  refer to
firms  and  time;  they  account  for  individual  unobservable  characteristics  influencing  the
investment-uncertainty  relationship  and  for  a  degree  of  dependency  over  time  across
companies due to collectively significant effects. Parameters a1, a2 and a3 are scalars, a4 is
a vector. Detailed definitions and data sources are in Appendix A1.
According to the irreversibility literature, the a priori sign of a2 should be negative
and significant. However, if the Hartman-Abel set-up applies, a2 should be positive or not
significantly different from zero. The elasticity of investment plans to expected demand and
the semi-elasticity of investment plans to the uncertainty can be computed with parameter
estimates and a set of alternative statistics of the sample distribution of the variables.
3. The data
Our dataset is constructed from three main sources: the Survey on Investment in
Manufacturing (SIM), the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS), and the breakdown by
sector of the National Account data (NA). The main source is SIM, annually conducted by
the Bank of Italy on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. By considering the whole
sample  of  firms  in  the  period  1996-2004,  the  total  number  of  observations  is  17,2489
(company-year cases). However, the questionnaire for firms with less than 50 employees
does not include the section on uncertainty so we are forced to ignore these firms and the
non-response cases, ending with a sample of 8,633 observations.
The SIM database is very rich and contains many pieces of original information that
cannot be found in other sources. This is the case of investment plans, expected demand and
the  range  between  its  minimum  and  maximum  growth  rate  expected  one  year  ahead
(henceforth, the min-max range); questions about liquidity constraints; some information on
the characteristics of the second-hand market for capital goods, and so on (regarding the
SIM database, see Banca d’Italia, 2006).
To  compute  a  proxy  for  uncertainty  we  use  the  min-max  range  of  the  expected
growth rate of demand. Let  1 it t g +  be the growth rate of the i
th company’s demand at constant
prices for t+1 as perceived in t and SALit the value at current prices of the i
th company’s
sales in t; both variables can be found in the SIM. The expected one-year-ahead level of





Y =  and  it PY is the individual
sales’ deflator, both from SIM.
5 If we define the uncertainty about the future demand growth
rate  ( ) 1 it t g u +  as the min-max range of the expected growth rate at constant prices reported
by the SIM respondents, we obtain the following definition of uncertainty:




1 it t it 1 it t 1 it t Y g g Y g u Y u + + + + - = =
The proxy of uncertainty in (2) simplifies that used by Guiso and Parigi, who exploit
a part of the questionnaire where respondents were asked, una tantum in 1993, to report their
whole  probability  distribution  of  the  expected  growth  rate  of  demand.  Any  comparison
between the two measures is not possible as they are not simultaneously available for the
same time period. Definition (2) has a number of advantages, however, because it provides
time-series data (for all the years in the 1996-2004 period) and it is a  simple  question,
thereby limiting the presence of errors in the reports.
6
                                                          
5 Individual sales’ deflators are obtained by applying the SIM growth rate for year t to the previous year NA
deflator level of the sector to which the firm belongs. We directly use NA sectoral deflator levels when SIM
growth rates are not available.
6 Since not all firms with more than 49 employees report the min-max range, we run a probit regression of non-
response probability against time dummies and a set of observable characteristics, such as industry, location,
type of ownership, size, and share of exported production (see Appendix 1.3 for more details). The only
significant effect concerns public and large firms, which are less likely to report the min-max range, hopefully
because the respondents are not close enough to the top management to provide a suitable answer. Therefore,
the loss of information due to non-responses should prevent large measurement errors for the min-max range.10
The SIM database is far from being complete for the aims of the present study as it
doe not contain some relevant variables, such as the capital stock, the cash flow, and other
information to compute the price-to-cost margin. These pieces of information can be found
in  the  CADS  database,  however.  After  merging  the  two  datasets,  the  total  number  of
available observations for the empirical analysis drops to 7,642, our final base-sample.
7
Notwithstanding  the  loss  of  observations  due  to  the  different  choices  and  to  the
merging operations described above, the final sample is a fairly satisfactory representation
of  the  composition  of  Italian  manufacturing  firms  by  size,  manufacturing  sector  and
geographical location (see Table A1.1 in Appendix A1).
A preliminary step of our empirical analysis is the estimation equation (1) in repeated
cross-sections, i.e. one for each year from 1996 to 2004. This allows us to have a set of
results that can be compared with those found in most of the empirical literature and at the
same  time  to  provide  some  evidence  about  the  evolution  over  time  of  the  parameter
estimates. As the cross-section specification of equation (1) does not allow us to estimate the
fixed company effects ai, we try to compensate for their exclusion by including in the Z-
vector  a  set  of  time-invariant  dummy  variables  to  proxy  for  the  firm’s  unobservable
heterogeneity in technology, market structure, and management tastes.
8 The time effects lt
are  proxied  by  the  intercept  of  equation  (1),  whose  estimates  are  allowed  to  change  in
repeated cross-sections.
Figure 1 reports the time path of the estimated elasticity of planned investments to
the  expected  demand,  and  of  the  a2  parameter  estimates;  the  dotted  lines  are  the
corresponding 90 per cent confidence intervals. Point estimates are often at least 10 per cent
significant (the elasticity of investment to demand lies in the 0.2-0.4 range, and the estimate
of  a2  is  always  negative),  and  decrease  in  absolute  value  over  time.  The  a2  estimates,
however, lose their significance in the last two years of the sample.
The last point suggests that, if we had had only (cross-section) data for a single year
in the second half of the sample, we would have probably estimated a low and scarcely
significant effect of uncertainty on investments, and a low elasticity of planned investments
to expected demand. The opposite would have occurred if we had had only cross-section
data for a single year in the first half of the sample, as in Guiso and Parigi (1999).
                                                          
7 Sectoral NA data are the source of depreciation rates and are also used to deflate nominal variables when SIM
prices are missing. Appendix A1 contains detailed definitions of our variables of interest.
8 These dummy variables refer to industry, location, size, type of ownership, merger-acquisition operations,
and zero cases of both effective investment and planned demand (see Appendix A1.3).11
Figure 1
EXPECTED DEMAND AND UNCERTAINTY EFFECTS ON INVESTMENT:
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1) The dotted lines delimit the corresponding 90 per cent confidence intervals.
4. Baseline estimates and robustness checks
The information about the companies in our sample may be better exploited using the
two-way  panel  approach,  i.e.  by  estimating  equation  (1)  with  fixed  individual  and  time
effects.
9 In this way, we can avoid the biases due to the omission of unobservable time-
invariant individual effects,  such  as the  entrepreneur’s  risk  aversion, and  of  collectively
significant  macroeconomic  effects  (hence  almost  invariant  for  all  companies),  such  as
industry-wide shocks, macroeconomic cyclical effects, widespread optimism-pessimism, or
risk aversion shifts over time. A major feature of the specification of equation (1) is that it is






  differs  from  the  one-year  lagged






- , because of the large discrepancies between ex ante plans
and ex post realisations due to shocks and news affecting the company’s behaviour after
plans  are  made  (see  Appendix  A2).  In  this context  the  demeaning  of  the  variables (the
‘within  transformation’)  to  account  for  fixed  effects  does  not  necessarily  entail  the






,  as  it  would  in  a  truly  dynamic  model.  Therefore,  equation  (1)
parameters can be estimated by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to within-transformed
                                                          
9  The  alternative  random  individual  effects  estimator  is  prone  to  be  biased  by  the  correlation  between
individual effects and the explanatory variables. Therefore we prefer, as usual in the literature, to rely on the at
least consistent fixed effects estimator, as suggested by the outcome of the Hausman (1978) specification test.12
data  (however,  the  OLS-within  estimates  are  also  compared  with  those  obtained  with  a
suitable GMM estimator for dynamic panels). Parameter standard errors are always adjusted
to account for generic heteroskedasticity (see White, 1980); hereafter, we will refer to them
as “robust” standard errors.
         Table 1
PLANNED INVESTMENTS AND UNCERTAINTY:
EQUATION (1) ESTIMATES AND DIAGNOSTICS 
1
   Regressors
2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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N´T 7642 7642 7642 7547 7060 7642
N 2141 2141 2141 2134 2078 2141
T 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.54 3.40 3.57
RMSE 0.1807 0.2128 0.1810 0.1810 0.1797 -
R
2 0.1284 0.1309 0.1249 0.1304 0.1319 0.0719 
6
(
1) Robust standard errors are in brackets. (
2) Specification of equation (1) unless otherwise
indicated.  (
3)  Variability  of  the  real,  expected  demand  growth  rate  one-year-ahead.  (
4)
Dummy equal to 1 for credit-rationed firms, see Appendix A1.3. (
5) Cash flow over capital
stock, see Appendix A1.3. (
6) Calculated as the squared correlation of actual-fitted data.
Table 1 reports parameter estimates and robust standard errors for six variants of the
equation (1) specification obtained using all the available data: an unbalanced panel of 2,141
companies (the number of time observations for each company ranges from 1 to 9 years,
with  an  average  of  3.57  years).  The  sample  dimension  is  not  constant  across  different
columns depending on the specific regressors used in the alternatives.13
The  first  column  of  Table  1  reports  the  estimates  of  equation  (1).  The  level  of
expected demand has a positive and significant effect on investment plans (a1): evaluated at
the  sample  medians  of  expected  demand  and  of  uncertainty,  the  planned  investments’
elasticity to expected demand is not different from unity; it halves when evaluated at the first
quartile of demand and doubles with the third quartile (point estimates and robust standard
errors are reported in the lower part of column 1 of Table 2).
Demand  uncertainty,  interacted  with  the  expected  demand,  has  a  significantly
negative  effect  on  investment  plans  (a2),  as  predicted  by  investment  models  based  on
irreversibility. Evaluated at sample medians, the elimination of demand uncertainty would
increase  the  investments  planned  for  the  following  year  by  0.8  per  cent  (1.3  when
uncertainty is reduced from the third to the first quartile of the sample distribution; see the
lower part of column 1 of Table 2).
It could be argued that the interaction between uncertainty and expected demand in
equation (1) may actually be capturing a second-order term in the Taylor approximation of a
non-linear  relationship  between  investment  plans  and  expected  demand.  Furthermore,  it
could be that uncertainty on one-year-ahead demand growth also has an additional direct
(i.e. not passing through demand dampening) effect on investments. To  check  for  these
additional  effects,  results  in  the  second  column  of  Table  1  report  the  estimates  of  a
specification  where  the  squared  expected  demand  (scaled  by  capital  stock)  and  our
uncertainty measure (the min-max range of demand growth) are added to equation (1). The
sign  and  the  significance  of  the  parameters  of  these  additional  regressors  may  be
respectively interpreted as evidence of non-linearity in the relationship between investment
plans and expected demand, and the net impact effect on planned investments of various
levels of uncertainty. None of these variable-additions is statistically significant, while the
other parameter estimates remain virtually unchanged.
10 This result suggests that, in our
case,  neither  non-linear  nor  uncertainty-level  effects  are  relevant  explanations  of
investments, while a2 parameter captures the cautionary effects of uncertainty..
Another possible objection to the specification of equation (1) is that the negative
effect of uncertainty on investment arises because it actually proxies for credit constraints: if
credit constraints are due to the company’s inherent riskiness, riskier firms may be more
liquidity-constrained and so plan less investment. This interpretation is assessed in column
                                                          
10 The joint hypothesis that the estimates of the two extra coefficients in column (3) are equal to zero is
accepted (p-value=18 per cent). A similar result is obtained if we add the two variables one at a time to
equation (1).14
(4) by adding the RATit variable to equation (1). RAT is a dummy equal to one if the i
th firm
at time t was rationed in the credit market, on the basis of the SIM replies to the questions on
credit applications (see Appendix A1.3). In column (5) we follow Fazzari, et al. (1988) by
adding, besides the RATit indicator, a measure of the firm’s cash flow net of dividend paid,
CFit, to proxy for liquidity constraints (see Appendix A1.3). The parameter estimates of
these two variables are largely not significant, both individually (t-statistics are smaller than
0.5) and jointly (the p-value of the test is 0.842), while the other parameter estimates rarely
depart from the corresponding ones in column (1).
In column (6) of Table 1 we estimated equation (1) with GMM-sys (see Blundell and
Bond, 1998) in order to assess for the robustness of our OLS-within estimates to possible
measurement errors and endogeneity due to dynamics, as discussed above. The GMM-sys
estimator is more general than other alternatives (it also allows us to instrument explanatory
variables’  levels  with  first  differences)  and  preserves  the  sample  dimension  while  the
alternative approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) based on first differences would have
implied  a  loss  of  2,920  observations  out  of  7,642.  GMM-sys  is  carried  out  using  as
instruments  the  theoretical  determinants  of  uncertainty  (reversibility  and  market  power
indicators, see Appendix A1.3) and lags of both effective and expected data on investments
and sales. In the light of the Hansen (1982) J test, the 602 over-identification restrictions are
not 5 per cent rejected and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test does not detect any signal of
autocorrelation  of  residuals.  Estimation  results  in  column  (6)  are  in  line  with  our  base
findings: the effects of interest are significant and the estimation intervals overlap those in
column (1). For this reason, in what follows we will only refer to the OLS-within estimates.
Finally,  we  have  substituted  the  dependent  variable,  investment  plans,  with  the
realised investment reported by the companies (a thorough description of this exercise is in
Appendix  A2).  In  this  case  we  expect  to  obtain  less  significant  parameter  estimates,  as
realised investment may have been driven by news that changed the initial plans of the
firms.  This  is  indeed  what  we  find  with  the  GMM-sys  estimator  as  equation  (1)  with
realised, instead of planned, data is a genuine dynamic panel model. Moreover, when we
add to the modified equation (1) the company investment plans, all other parameters lose
their significance, indicating that investment plans can be considered sufficient statistics for
realised investment.
Overall,  panel  estimates  seem  to  confirm  qualitatively  the  cross-section  results:
investment  plans  are  directly  linked  to  expected  demand,  and  the  effect  of  uncertainty
appears to be negative and significant even after a series of robustness checks. However,15
from  a  quantitative  point  of  view,  some  differences  appear  regarding  the  value  of  the
elasticity to expected demand, as also shown by our repeated cross-section estimates.
5. The effect of uncertainty in sub-samples
The empirical analysis of the influence of different theoretical hypotheses, such as
the irreversibility degree of capital goods, market power of firms and flexibility of the labour
input, is performed by splitting the sample of firms according to some indicator  it s  (usually
equal to one if the observation is included in the sub-sample of interest, zero otherwise),
supposed to be a good proxy of the phenomenon under scrutiny (for example, price-cost
margin is used as an indicator of firms’ market power). Given that these indicators may not
be exogenous for the problem at hand, there is the risk that the parameter estimates in the
different  sub-samples  may  be  biased  because  of  the  endogeneity  of  the  selection  rule
determining the indicator. More specifically, a selection problem occurs if the probability of
being  included  in  a  sub-sample  of  interest  is  related  to  the  dependent  variable  (i.e.  the
outcome  it s   of  the  selection  indicator  is  simultaneous  with  the  investment  plans’
idiosyncratic  shock  1 + it e ).  Therefore,  changes  in  fixed-effects  estimates  in  different  sub-
samples indicate genuine parameter changes (and not bias) only if we can exclude such
simultaneity by accounting for the non-random nature of the sub-samples.
In this context, tests for sample selection bias are constructed on the basis of a null
hypothesis that the selection rule can be ignored for the estimates of equation (1), while the
alternative  implies  a  bias  due  to  endogenous  selectivity.  With  fixed-effects  estimation
techniques, implementations of tests for selection bias are straightforward by testing the
significance of additional variables. In this Section we use two different tests: one uses
either  1 it s - - - -  or  1 it s + + + +  as an auxiliary regressor in equation (1) (see Nijman and Verbeek, 1992);
the other adds to equation (1) the inverse Mills ratio from a pooled probit regression for the
selection indicator  it s  (see Wooldridge, 1995).
11 The first approach has the main advantage
of avoiding the estimation of an explicit model for the selection rule and, as such, is not
                                                          
11 In order to ensure structural parameter identification, the explanatory variables of the probit models include
several regressors besides the expected demand, uncertainty and realised investments (i.e. the main equation
(1) regressors): dummy variables for a set of observable characteristics (such as industry, location, type of
ownership, size, and share of exported production) and one-lag of the price-cost margin, of the labour turnover
and the overtime index depending on the selection rule being modelled.16
subject to relevant mis-specification errors. However, it does not work if  it s  is constant by
firm in the selected sub-sample.
It is worth observing that the problem of selection bias cannot be tackled in a pure
cross-section context, as in Guiso and Parigi (1999). The results shown below may therefore
be considered an extension of their analysis. In all the estimates presented in this Section we
do not reject the null of exogenous selection (in each table the corresponding p-values are
reported together with model parameter estimates) and can safely conclude that the selection
bias problem may not be so relevant for our analysis. This outcome may be due, among
other, to the low number of 0-1 switches in  it s  by firm. The latter point is stressed by
considering the estimation results related to the firms that always remain in the same sub-
sample or at most switch once in five years.
5.1 Irreversibility and market power
In the irreversibility theory of investment the negative effects of uncertainty arise
from the difficulty of liquidating installed capital when demand proves to be lower than
expected.  However,  according  to  Caballero  (1991)  the  presence  of  irreversibility  is  not
sufficient to render a negative relationship between investment and uncertainty: some degree
of  imperfect  competition  is  the  crucial  determinant.  In  this  paragraph  we  test  both  the
hypotheses of irreversibility and the degree of competition and a combination of the two.
The  results  seem  to  confirm  Caballero’s  suggestion:  the  negative  effect  of  uncertainty
appears to be stronger for irreversible firms with a higher degree of market power.
To quantify the influence of irreversibility, we split our full sample in two parts
according to a reversibility indicator obtained on the basis of the SIM information about
transactions in the secondary market for capital goods and about leasing investment (see
Appendix A1.3). This indicator captures to a certain extent the reversibility of investment
decisions because it takes into account the “putty/putty” feature of the technology used by
the firm. In this context, we may compute two reversibility indicators: a “strong” and a
“weak” one. The strong indicator is obtained on the basis of single cases (company-year):
reversibility occurs when the i
th company at time t explicitly uses the opportunity to buy in
the second-hand and/or in the leasing markets. In this case a single company may belong in
some years to the “high reversibility” group and in others to the “low reversibility” one. The
weak  indicator  is  based  on  all  the  cases  relating  to  the  same  company.  In  particular,  a
company is classified in the “high reversibility” group if it uses the opportunity to buy in the
second-hand and/or in the leasing markets at least twice during the sample period.17
Table  2  (columns  2  to  5)  shows  the  results  of  the  estimates  of  equation  (1)  by
splitting the sample according to the high or low reversibility groups (column 1 replicates
the first column of Table 1 to ease comparisons). The estimates of the uncertainty parameter
are lower (in absolute value) and not significant for the sub-sample characterised by a high
degree of reversibility. Vice versa, in the sub-sample of the companies with a low degree of
reversibility, the estimates of the uncertainty parameter are higher in absolute value and
largely significant. In this case the uncertainty effect on investment plans is almost four
times as high as that for the companies with a higher degree of reversibility.
The characteristics of the product market may be analyzed through the degree of
market power of a company. This can be measured on the basis of the deviations of the
company’s price-cost margin with respect the median of the industrial sector to which it
belongs (results do not change if the mean is used).
12 The price-cost margin is computed
according to Domowitz et al. (1986; see Appendix A1.3). With this indicator we can classify
the companies in our sample into two sub-samples according to the “low” or “high” degree
of their market power. In Table 2 (columns 6 to 11) the estimates of equation (1) for the sub-
samples relating to the market power show that the uncertainty effect is stronger for firms





is significant and stronger than that of the total sample, while for the companies belonging to
the low market power group, it is very low and not significant (column 9). Again, as in the
irreversibility case, the prediction of the theory appears to be confirmed.
As the price-cost margin is only a proxy of the real market power of a company or of
the degree of competition in the product market, we consider a further specification linked to
the presence of the Italian firms on foreign markets.
On one hand, it is possible that companies which sell a significant share of their
products abroad have faced tougher competition in the last ten years. The adoption of the
euro  put  an  end  to  the  practice  of  ‘competitive  devaluations’  of  the  lira  and  the
contemporaneous development of new industrialized countries has hit the so-called “made in
Italy” products particularly hard.
                                                          
12 See Martin (1984) for a discussion of the problems of using the price-cost margins as indicator of market
power. Similar results regarding the effects of competition on the investment-uncertainty relationship have
been found in Bulan (2005) and in Bulan et al. (2006), where the degree of competition is proxied by the
concentration index and by the number of competitors of the firm, respectively. By measuring competition
with the degree of seller concentration, Ghosal and Loungani (1996) find the opposite result (i.e. the negative
effect of uncertainty is stronger in more competitive industries).18
On the other hand, this does not mean that more domestically oriented firms have not
experienced an increase in competition. Moreover, it has been argued that many export-
oriented  firms  have  been  able  to  exploit  specific  market  niches  where  their  highly
specialised products may shelter them from competitive pressures.
These two competing interpretations can be empirically evaluated by considering
explicitly the export propensity of the firms in our data set. More specifically, we construct
two more sub-samples for both the “high” and the “low” market power cases according to
whether the export shares of the companies are greater or lower than 50 per cent (we have
also tried with different share intervals with no substantial difference).
The results in Table 2 show that for the companies in the high market power group
which sell more on the domestic market the coefficient estimate of uncertainty in column (8)
doubles, implying an even greater market power. On the contrary, for the companies with an
export share greater than 50 per cent the uncertainty effect in column (7), though significant,
appears to be weaker than in the total sample estimates. By considering the firms with an
export share below 50 per cent in the low market power group, the estimated coefficient of
uncertainty in column (11) is significant and close to the one estimated for the total sample.
The  final  step  in  this  paragraph  is  to  combine  the  irreversibility  and  the  “high”
market  power  groups.  For  reversibility,  we  have  chosen  to  concentrate  only  on  the
classification  based  on  the  ‘weak’  indicator,  which  appears  to  be  more  robust  than  the
‘strong’ one as it is based on the behaviour of firms over the whole time period and not only
on single events. Columns (12) and (13) of Table 2 report the estimates for the sub-sample
of the companies classified as both ’high market power’ and ’low reversibility’, and the sub-
sample of the companies classified both as “low market power” and “high reversibility”,
respectively.  Confirming  our  a  priori,  the  uncertainty  parameter  estimates  appear  to  be
higher in absolute value in the group where firms use more irreversible capital goods and are
more likely to face less competition, while it is almost negligible in the other group. The
effect on investment plans is almost twice as strong as that of the firms in the second group.
5.2 Labour flexibility
The  theoretical  literature  on  the  investment-uncertainty  relationship  has  generally
ignored the characteristics of the labour input in the investment decision process.         Table 2
PLANNED INVESTMENTS, REVERSIBILITY AND MARKET POWER 
1
Reversibility Market power
Low High High low






















Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)





(0.0125) (0.0307) (0.0284) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0060) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0256) (0.0522) (0.0065) (0.0062) (0.0049)





(0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0135) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0215) (0.0121) (0.0283) (0.0085) (0.0176) (0.0095) (0.0339) (0.0121)





- (0.0513) (0.1139) (0.1241) (0.0390) (0.0584) (0.0911) (0.0895) (0.1420) (0.0822) (0.2293) (0.0572) ((0.0456) (0.0270)
N´T 7642 2353 2525 5289 5117 3549 1254 2295 3555 1175 2380 1007 2377
N 2141 1000 1264 1141 1730 1322 442 880 1400 444 956 529 775
T 3.57 2.35 2.00 4.64 2.96 2.68 2.84 2.61 2.54 2.65 2.49 1.90 3.07
RMSE 0.1807 0.2443 0.1871 0.1401 0.1310 0.1396 0.1565 0.1288 0.1974 0.2560 0.1311 0.1944 0.1202
R
2 0.1284 0.1827 0.2264 0.1013 0.1101 0.1128 0.1409 0.1069 0.1900 0.3852 0.1315 0.0825 0.1166
- - 0.463 - 0.194 0.928 0.757 0.322 0.973 0.299 0.406 0.676 0.346 Sample
selection
bias tests 
2 - 0.190 0.761 0.295 0.037 0.455 0.709 0.905 0.433 0.555 0.049 0.669 0.054
ELASTICITY OF PLANNED INVESTMENTS TO EXPECTED DEMAND
(evaluated at median uncertainty)
1.062 1.594 2.023 0.640 0.640 0.794 1.134 0.845 1.497 3.147 0.554 0.423 0.784 Median (Q2)
(0.444) (1.087) (1.001) (0.120) (0.152) (0.212) (0.370) (0.360) (0.908) (1.845) (0.231) (0.219) (0.172)
% CHANGE OF INVESTMENTS FROM A REDUCTION IN UNCERTAINTY
(evaluated at median demand)
1.300 2.262 2.932 0.508 0.738 1.515 1.112 3.898 0.905 2.172 0.653 0.936 0.510 from Q3 to Q1
(0.677) (1.560) (1.766) (0.393) (0.421) (0.640) (0.362) (2.138) (0.855) (2.968) (0.298) (0.395) (0.391)
(
1) Regressions with heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors (in brackets). (
2) P-values of the tests for sample selection bias due to Nijman and Verbeek (1992) in the row above, and
to Wooldridge (1995) in the row below.In most analyses the labour input is optimized out under the assumption of costless
adjustment. Only Lee and Shin (2000) take explicitly into account the role of this production
factor in the investment decision. Their results show that more can be understood about the
investment-uncertainty relationship  by  explicitly  considering  the  flexibility  of  the  labour
input. In particular, the uncertainty effect should be weaker (stronger) for companies with a
higher (lower) labour share.
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  Table 3













Low High Low High
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)





(0.0125) (0.0076) (0.0251) (0.0162) (0.0056) (0.0438) (0.0111) (0.0618)





(0.0139) (0.0241) (0.0105) (0.0149) (0.023) (0.0111) (0.0376) (0.0158)





- (0.0513) (0.0426) (0.0486) (0.0633) (0.0631) (0.0843) (0.1081) (0.1680)
N´T 7642 3867 3775 6365 3414 2951 1781 1501
N 2141 1477 1560 2008 1397 1278 895 865
T 3.57 2.62 2.42 3.17 2.44 2.31 1.99 1.74
RMSE 0.1807 0.1300 0.1912 0.1846 0.1275 0.1911 0.1318 0.1917
R
2 0.1284 0.1089 0.1933 0.1388 0.1101 0.3802 0.1213 0.5548
- 0.439 0.552 - 0.526 0.498 0.894 0.506 Sample
selection
bias tests 
2 - 0.311 0.772 - 0.970 0.405 0.760 0.404
ELASTICITY OF PLANNED INVESTMENTS TO EXPECTED DEMAND
(evaluated at median uncertainty)
1.062 0.660 1.578 1.179 0.442 3.657 0.522 4.980 Median
(Q2) (0.444) (0.268) (0.893) (0.574) (0.198) (1.554) (0.390) (2.189)
% CHANGE OF INVESTMENTS FROM A REDUCTION IN UNCERTAINTY
(evaluated at median demand)
1.300 1.726 0.917 1.422 1.186 2.431 1.763 3.370 from Q3 to
Q1 (0.678) (0.895) (0.742) (0.793) (0.631) (1.790) (1.222) (3.513)
The footnotes (
1) and (
2) are the same as in Table 2.
                                                          
13 The increase in the labour share is directly linked to the flexibility of the labour input. Eberly and Van
Mieghen (1997) show that when a production factor is more flexible it is more exploited than other more rigid
inputs so that its share increases.21
This implication of Lee and Shin’s analysis can be empirically tested in the context
of our analysis. The data set of the SIM contains useful information on several features of
the labour input used by the companies in the sample, such as the amount of hired and fired
workers over the year, the total number of hours worked, of overtime hours and of hours in
the wage supplementation fund (CIG, from Cassa Integrazione e Guadagni).
On the basis of this information we can compute two indicators of labour flexibility.
The first is a measure of workers’ turnover (WT), defined as the sum of the number of hired
and  fired  employees  divided  by  the  stock  of  total  employment  in  the  year.  The  second
measure (WH) is given by sum of the total number of overtime and CIG hours divided by
the total number of hours worked. As the data about overtime hours have been collected
since 1998, all the regressions involving WH concern only the 1998-2004 sub-sample period
(see Appendix A1.3). As in the irreversibility and market power exercises, the i
th firm is
classified as belonging to the high (low) labour flexibility group if WTit or WHit is higher
(lower) than the corresponding median values in t of the sector to which the firm belongs.
Table 3 reports the estimates of equation (1) for the full sample (column 1) and the
1998-2004  sub-period  (column  4).  The  results  seem  to  confirm  Lee  and  Shin’s  (2000)
analysis:  investment  plans  of  firms  with  high  labour  flexibility  (columns  3  and  6)  are
considerably less influenced by uncertainty about future demand. The reverse is true for
firms with low labour flexibility (columns 2 and 5): in this case the elasticity of investment
plans with respect to expected demand is less than half that for firms with high labour
flexibility.
The two indicators we have computed may be interpreted as a proxy of two different
forms of flexibility, related to the possibility of changing the number of employees (WT) or
the number of hours worked according to the needs of production (WH). It may therefore be
useful  to  consider  a  third  case,  in  which  the  high  (low)  flexibility  group  is  defined
simultaneously according to both indicators. The results of this splitting (columns 7 and 8)
show  that  for  the  companies  with  a  very  flexible  labour  input  the  effect  of  uncertainty
continues to be non-significant, while it attains its maximum (negative) value in the opposite
case  (this result  could  be  even stronger  if  we  consider  that  some  firms  may  have  been
classified  among  the  low  flexibility  group  because  they  have  chosen  not  to  exploit  the
potential flexibility of their labour input).
As a final step we check the results for the group of companies selected according to
their labour flexibility and degree of market power. The estimates of our specification in
these different cases are shown in Table 4.22
Table 4










Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)





(0.0125) (0.0251) (0.0063) (0.0486) (0.0076) (0.0170) (0.0058)





(0.0139) (0.0105) (0.0262) (0.0095) (0.0241) (0.0345) (0.0272)





- (0.0513) (0.0486) (0.0910) (0.0567) (0.0426) (0.0705) (0.0300)
N´T 7642 3775 1678 1820 3867 1871 1735
N 2141 1560 847 957 1477 884 865
T 3.57 2.42 1.98 1.90 2.62 2.12 2.01
RMSE 0.1807 0.1912 0.1104 0.2208 0.1300 0.1186 0.0947
R
2 0.1284 0.1933 0.1285 0.3314 0.1089 0.2106 0.0709
- 0.552 0.269 0.753 0.439 0.428 0.336 Sample selection
bias tests 
2
- 0.772 0.454 0.724 0.311 0.931 0.738
ELASTICITY OF PLANNED INVESTMENTS TO EXPECTED DEMAND
(evaluated at median uncertainty)
1.062 1.578 0.565 2.750 0.660 2.518 0.304 Median (Q2)
(0.444) (0.893) (0.224) (1.722) (0.268) (0.593) (0.208)
% CHANGE OF INVESTMENTS FROM TO A REDUCTION IN UNCERTAINTY
(evaluated at median demand)
1.300 0.917 1.173 2.273 1.726 6.929 0.332 From Q3 to Q1
(0.677) (0.742) (0.541) (1.878) (0.895) (3.876) (0.264)
The footnotes (
1) and (
2) are the same as in Table 2.
The general impression is that the market power characteristic tends to dominate that
of  labour  flexibility.  This  is  fairly  clear  in  columns  (3)  and  (7),  in  which  the  explicit
consideration of market power completely offsets the results obtained previously for labour
flexibility; in the remaining two cases (columns 4 and 6) the estimates confirm and reinforce
those already obtained when only market power was used (see Table 2, columns 6 and 9).
This set of results seems to suggest that the information content of our measures of labour
flexibility is somehow accounted for by the degree of market power. More evidence on this
point will be provided in the next Section.23
6. The effect of uncertainty over time
The  time  dimension  of  our  dataset  allows  us  to  conduct  an  analysis  of  the
investment-uncertainty relationship over time. The evidence provided by the repeated cross-
section  estimates  in  Section  3  (especially  the  evolution  of  the  estimated  coefficient  of
uncertainty in Figure 1) may be interpreted as a sign of instability affecting our panel results.
This implies the presence of a break in the parameter estimates of equation (1).
As the exact timing of the break is not known, we test for the stability of parameters
a1 a2 a3 by computing repeated Chow tests in the 1999-2003 period. More specifically, five
regressions of equation (1) are computed, where we add interaction terms between the three
regressors - i.e. expected demand, uncertainty and lagged realised investments - and step
dummies Dt (equal to zero before t, 1 afterwards, with t ranging from 1999 to 2003).
Table 5
STABILITY OF PARAMETERS OVER TIME 
1, 2




no in 1999 In 2000 in 2001 in 2002 in 2003
0.0301 0.0262 0.0273 0.0265 0.0291 0.0319 a1
(0.0125) (0.0094) (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0122) (0.0133)
-0.0318 -0.0490 -0.0510 -0.0450 -0.0400 -0.0350 a2
(0.0139) (0.0170) (0.0160) (0.0170) (0.0130) (0.0150)
0.0284 0.1118 0.0964 0.1097 0.0904 0.0203 a3
(0.0513) (0.0590) (0.0425) (0.0425) (0.0339) (0.0547)
0.0070 0.0072 0.0064 -0.0031 0.0004 a’1
(0.0064) (0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0037) (0.0036)
0.0430 0.0410 0.0330 0.0370 0.0320 a’2
(0.0190) (0.0170) (0.0180) (0.0190) (0.0200)
-0.1213 -0.1348 -0.2116 -0.2475 0.1369 a’3
(0.0824) (0.0892) (0.1042) (0.1397) (0.1000)
RMSE 0.1807 0.1787 0.1783 0.1779 0.1786 0.1802
R
2 0.1284 0.1479 0.1515 0.1557 0.1485 0.1333
Parameter constancy  test:
4
F statistic 1.726 1.732 1.785 2.110 1.465
Degrees of freedom 3 3 3 3 3
P-value 0.1594 0.1582 0.1477 0.0968 0.2219
(
1) Robust standard errors in brackets. (
2) The dimension of the sample is 7,642 observations for 2,141 firms.
(
3)  The  a1-a3  parameters  are  those  in  equation  (1),  while  the  a’1-a’3  parameters  capture  their  change
according to the break years shown in the columns. (
4) Chow test. When the break date is unknown, repeated
Chow tests lead to the sup-Wald statistic, i.e. the largest F statistics (see Andrews, 1993) which in our case
corresponds to the year 2002 in column (5). The corresponding test statistic is 2.11 against a 10 per cent
critical value of about 4; then the estimates of the a1, a2 and a3 parameters are jointly stable.24
These  interaction effects  are associated  with  the  a’1  a’2  a’3  parameter  estimates
reported in Table 5. The results of the tests (Table 5, last three rows) seem to suggest the
absence of any break: unobservable factors and shocks may explain the temporal evolution
of  the  parameter  estimates  in  repeated  cross-sections.  Given  that  the  short  time  span
available  for  testing  suggests  caution  in  interpreting  this  result,  we  cannot  exclude  the
instability of one of the coefficients of equation (1). In particular, the a2 parameter shows
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The thick solid line reports the estimates of a2t parameters; the two thin. solid lines delimit the
corresponding 95 per cent confidence interval. The dotted, horizontal line corresponds to the
mean of the nine a2t estimates (the shaded area delimit the 95 per cent confidence interval).
To investigate the issue further, we specified an equation where the a2 parameter is
allowed to vary over time in a deterministic way. More specifically, we substitute the a2
parameter in equation (1) with nine interaction terms between uncertainty and time dummies
(with a2t parameters).
The time path of the a2t estimates and of their standard errors is reported in Figure 2,








                                                          
14 Though in a different context and with more aggregate data, Caselli et al. (2003) find an instability of the
demand effect on investment that disappears once uncertainty is included in the investment equation.25
Although the differences between the a2t point estimates appear to be not statistically
significant,
15 their pattern in Figure 2 is suggestive of a shift occurring between the average
estimates before and after the year 2000. In fact, the average estimate of the uncertainty
effect in the 1996-2000 period is equal to –0.065 (standard error = 0.016), while it increases
to –0.001 (standard error = 0.012) in the 2001-2004 period. Therefore, the estimated shift
between the two periods is equal to 0.064 (standard error = 0.02) and is largely significant
(t-statistic = 3.2).
16
The  explanation  of  such  an  evolution  of  the  uncertainty  effect  requires  a  deeper
analysis of the structural features of the uncertainty-investment relationship. In this paper we
have investigated some of characteristics suggested by the literature, such as risk aversion,
liquidity constraints, irreversibility, labour flexibility and the degree of market power.
Risk aversion is an unobservable variable that our panel approach, with individual
and time effects, can properly account for in estimating the a parameters (while the cross-
section  approach  can  only  do  so  to  a  very  limited  extent).  However,  it  cannot  be
disentangled from other unobservable effects. For the other three determinants, some proxies
are available and their correlation over time with the evolution of the uncertainty effect
presented in Figure 2 can be analyzed. While for liquidity constraints we have shown their
irrelevance in Section 4, for the other determinants a dynamic pattern cannot be excluded a
priori.
In the case of reversibility, the technical progress may have had some effects on the
characteristics of the capital goods, limiting their irreversibility once installed. Since suitable
variables do not exist, we have employed some proxy based on the share of companies that
have used second-hand and/or leasing markets for their capital goods. Had irreversibility
decreased over time, according to our indicator the share of “reversible” firms should have
increased. Actually, we observe the opposite effect: over the period under examination the
share of reversible firms drops and this should imply a more negative effect of uncertainty.
                                                          
15 The hypothesis that a2t = a2 " t is not rejected (p-value = 0.38) and the two 95 per cent confidence intervals in
Figure 2 (i.e. of a2t and of  2 ˆ a ) overlap; moreover, the average estimate  = 2 ˆ a -0.0307 is very close to the panel
estimate,  = 2 ˆ a  -0.0318 (see Table 1).
16 These results are robust to a number of alternative hypotheses about the behaviour of a1 and a3 parameters. In
fact, the estimates in Table 5 might suggest a shift in the a3 parameter as well. In order to prevent such shift
affecting the a2t estimates, we performed the same exercise as for Figure 2, but with a 2001 break in the a3
parameter. Results for the a2t estimates remain broadly unchanged. Finally, if we allow for a 2001 break in both
the a1 and a3 parameters, the joint restriction to zero of the corresponding a’1 and a’3 parameters in a model
with time varying a2t is not rejected (p-value = 0.11).26
For  labour  flexibility,  the  results  in  Section  5.2  show  that  their  effect  may  be
somehow obscured by that of the degree of market power, which shows, in Figure 3, a
dynamic pattern consistent with that of the uncertainty effect. We have therefore chosen, at
least initially, to concentrate only on the degree of market power.
Figure 3
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(1)  Measures of centre and dispersion of the price-cost margin sample distribution.
Details about price-cost margin computation are given in Appendix A1.3.
In analogy with Domowitz et al. (1986), we address the influence of changes in
price-cost margins on investment plans through demand uncertainty by adding an interaction
with alternative measures of price-cost margins, Xit:
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In this way the coefficient a2 in equation (1) is allowed to vary over time as a linear
function  of  market  power:  it it X 2 2 , 2 b a a + = ,  where  the  b2  parameter  measures  the
influence of the market power proxy Xit on the effect of uncertainty on planned investments.
Equation (1) is a valid reduction of (3) when the restriction b2 = 0 holds; moreover, the
validity  of  our  conjecture  that  the  evolution  of  the  uncertainty  effect  is  driven  by  the
dynamics of the price-cost margin implies that in equation (3) b2 < 0.27
In Table 6 we report only the estimates of equation (3) based on the level of price-
cost margins (PCMit; in another set of regressions we have also used the deviation of PCMit
from its sectoral median/mean at time t and that from the overall sectoral median/mean with
no significant change to the estimates). The b2 estimate (column 1) is negative and very
significant,  thus  supporting  our  assumption  that  the  degree  of  market  power  affects
investments through uncertainty, in line with the variability over time of the a2t parameter.
          Table 6




Xit = PCMit PCMit PCMit and OPst PCMit and WTit
Parameters:
3
a1 0.0302 0.0305 0.0300 0.0305
(0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0136)
a2 0.0050
(0.0124)
a3 0.0093 0.0091 0.0098 0.0087
(0.0536) (0.0537) (0.0533) (0.0535)
b2 -0.3405 -0.3037 -0.5088 -0.4504
(0.1493) (0.1109) (0.2059) (0.1825)
g2 0.0175 0.0259
(0.0138) (0.0248)
RMSE 0.1790 0.1790 0.1787 0.1788
R
2 0.1351 0.1349 0.1382 0.1371
(
1) Robust standard errors in brackets. Sample dimensions: N´T=7104 and N=2080; 7 per
cent of observations and of 2.8 per cent of firms are lost for the merging of the SIM and the
CADS databases. (
2) Obtained by imposing zero-restrictions to non-significant estimates in
column (1) specification. (
3) Parameter definitions in equation (3); g2 parameter has the same
meaning as the b2 parameter.
In the previous sections we have shown that the proxy of the degree of market power
may be better measured by considering the effect of competition from foreign firms, both on
internal and international markets, and the role played by the characteristics of the labour
input.  More  specifically,  we  have  taken  into  account  two  variables:  an  indicator  of  the
foreign openness of the sector to which the individual company belongs (OPst), defined as
the sum of imports and exports over the value added at factor cost (see Appendix A1.3); a
labour flexibility indicator, given by the turnover index (WTit , see Section 5.2). In these two
cases X becomes a vector of two variables and the new  parameter to be estimated, say g2,
measures the interaction between uncertainty and OP or WT, as b2 in the case of PCM.28
The estimates of these two extensions - see columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 - do not
appear significant: for the WT indicator this may be interpreted as a confirmation of the
previous finding about the dominance of the PCM (see Section 5.2); for the OP indicator it
might be due to its reduced variability, as it is measured at the sector level. However, in both
cases the estimates of the coefficient of PCM are highly significant.
Figure 4
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNCERTAINTY EFFECTS

































































The two left-hand panels show the relationship between the uncertainty effect and PCM (the horizontal line
corresponds to the panel estimate, the vertical one to the sample PCM average). The right-hand panels show
the corresponding time paths of the uncertainty effect measured by the average of the estimates (the three
horizontal lines correspond to the panel estimate, equal to -0.032, and its 66 per cent confidence interval).
Figure  4  (left-hand  panels)  shows  the  two  estimated  relationships
st it it WT PCM 2 2 , 2 g b a + =   and  st 2 it 2 it , 2 OP PCM g b a + + + + = = = =   for  each  individual  company;
when either OP (top-left panel) or WT (bottom-left panel) increases a2,it moves to the top-
right, implying a weakening of the uncertainty effect. These results are consistent with an
explanation of the progressive weakening of the uncertainty effect based on the reduction of
the price-to-cost margins along with an increase in labour turnover and in the competitive
pressures from foreign companies.
7. The uncertainty-investment relationship: just a cyclical phenomenon?
The  link  between  the  uncertainty  effect  on  investment  plans  and  the  price-cost
margin could be interpreted in a strictly cyclical context. According to Domowitz et al.29
(1986) the evolution of the price-cost margins appears to be pro-cyclical, driven by demand:
during expansionary phases the price-cost margin is higher than in recessionary periods. In
the light of our results, this implies that the uncertainty effect on  investment  should  be
counter-cyclical. As this effect is inversely proportional to price-cost margins, during an
expansion the presence of uncertainty acts as a brake on the propensity to invest. Vice versa,
in recessions the negative effect of uncertainty weakens considerably. This is an interesting
result, which has never been analyzed before. But is it the whole story?
A  stream  of  the  theoretical  literature  on  the  investment-uncertainty  relationship
emphasizes the role of capital irreversibility along with some assumptions about the product
markets and the technology of the firm. Another stream of the literature puts the emphasis
also on the other production input, labour: when a firm operates in perfect competition and
the labour input is flexible, the uncertainty effect may become non-negative. This implies
that,  besides  cyclical  factors,  there  might  be  a  more  structural  explanation  behind  the
evolution of the uncertainty effect.
Thanks to the availability of a panel of data on a fairly long time period, covering a
complete  business  cycle,  we  show  that  the  uncertainty  effect  on  investment  plans  of  a
sample of Italian manufacturing firms evolves over time, gradually weakening. We are able
to show that this time path may be influenced by the underlying evolution of the firm’s
price-to-cost margins, which have been decreasing smoothly over the period. If the price-
cost margin may be considered a proxy of the degree of market power, our results could be
interpreted  as  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  for  companies  with  low  market  power  the
uncertainty  effect  is  lower.  More  generally,  this  may  imply  that  in  a  more  competitive
environment,  the  inherent  volatility  of  investment  may  be  lower  because  of  the  less
significant role of uncertainty.
This seems to fit fairly well with the Italian manufacturing sector. Over the period
under examination, international markets have been characterised by a rise in competition
fostered by the fall in transport and communication costs, along with a reduction of trade
barriers. New players have appeared, raising the competitive pressure on the production of
the traditional industrial countries. The Italian manufacturing sector, traditionally specialized
in low-technology products, has been particularly hit by these global trends. At the same
time, Italian firms have experienced another profound change: the adoption of the euro, the
European common currency, that ruled out the possibility of devaluing the lira to regain30
some competitive power (the so-called “competitive devaluations” so frequent in the past
economic history of the Italian economy).
17
Along with these external factors, the labour market in Italy has undergone a process
of slow but constant change, with a series of economic policy decisions aimed at reducing
the degree of rigidity in the use of the labour input. We have shown that for firms employing
a more flexible labour input (in terms of both employees and working hours) uncertainty
about expected demand has a weaker effect on investment decisions. This result casts a new
light on the issue of labour flexibility implications. The recent literature (see Brandolini et
al, 2006) has shown that a higher degree of flexibility may have negative effects on the
firm’s productivity as the reduction of hiring and firing costs make it more convenient to
employ ’less efficient’ workers. Our findings suggest that efficiency might also be improved
via the positive relationship between the degree of labour flexibility and the elasticity of
investment with respect to demand. In general, both at the international and at the domestic
level, we can identify a common evolution towards an economic environment, in which the
interplay  of  a  higher  degree  of  competition,  a  more  flexible  labour  market  and  the
production technology may imply a weaker effect of uncertainty on investment decisions.
This  conclusion,  and  the  whole  set  of  results  presented  in  this  paper,  should  be
considered  tentative  however.  Further  research  is  needed  to  investigate  the  relationship
between  investment,  uncertainty  and  demand.  Another  issue  we  have  only  marginally
tackled is that of the proper dependent variable to use. So far, nearly all the empirical works
have been based on realised investment, but most of the theory has to do with desired or
expected investment (our “investment plans”). Our efforts (see Butzen et al, 2003, for a
similar application to Belgian manufacturing firms) have shown that much can be gained by
exploiting self-reported data when no other reliable information is available.
                                                          
17 There were other periods in the past when the lira joined a sort of monetary system. However these episodes
cannot be compared with the adoption of the euro. While in the past everyone knew that the lira could at any
moment withdraw from the monetary system, with the euro this appears to be quite impossible. In this sense we
may say that a sort of psychological factor is at work: the awareness that the euro is ‘irreversible’.31
Appendix A1: Data sources and definition of variables
A1.1 – Effective and planned investments
From the SIM source, both effective and planned investments at current prices are
available,  disaggregated  in  three  types  of  goods:  structures,  machinery  and  equipment;
vehicles; non-residential buildings. For the i
th company (i = 1, 2, …, N, N = 4860) at year t (t
= 1, 2, ..., T, T = 9, from 1996 to 2004), we indicate with 
j
it INV  and 
j
1 it t INV +  the level of
effective investment realised in t, and of the investment planned in t for t+1, respectively;
the superscript j (= m or f) indicates the type of good. In this paper we choose to analyse the
behaviour of investment in structures, machinery, equipment and vehicles (j = m), compared
with that of buildings (j = f).
18
The corresponding data at constant (1995) prices are obtained in the following way.
j
it INV  are deflated using the corresponding NA sectoral investment prices 
j
st PI  for










The investment price for t+1 as perceived in t and used to deflate 
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1 it t PI ) ( PI + + + = p 1 , where 
j
1 it t + p  is the expected inflation of the j-type investment
price (estimated from the SIM source)
20, and 
j
st PI  are the sectoral NA data defined above.
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A1.2 – Stock of capital
The data on capital stocks, at constant prices, are constructed, for both j = m and f,
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where I and d are the effective investment at constant prices and the depreciation
rate. By type of good investments, 
j
it I , are those obtained in previous Section A1.1. The time
series of depreciation rates 
j




it d d =  for all companies belonging to s
th industry.
                                                          
18 SIM database reports, for each year in the sample, both preliminary and final investment figures. Given that
the paper focuses on the explanation of planned investments for t+1, we prefer to use preliminary data because
they are the only investment figures available in t, i.e. at the time new investments are planned. From statistical
analyses, it turns out that preliminary and final data coincide for the large majority of cases (85 per cent for m
goods and 91for f goods).
19 Manufacturing activity is disaggregated into 13 sectors.
20 From SIM, only the total-investment expected inflation, 
1 it t + p , is available. Data for  j
1 it t + p  are estimated by
exploiting  the  sectoral  NA  inflation  differential  of  j-type  investment  with  respect  to  the  total  m+  f,  i.e.:
) ( 1 st
j
1 st 1 it t
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+ p  is the j-type investment price inflation rate, and the total







+ p  .32
In order to obtain the initial values of the capital stocks, we exploit the “accounting”
initial  values 
j
i K 0  obtained  from  CADS  nominal  book  values,  deflated  with  the  same
sectoral investment deflators employed for 
j
it INV .
21 In particular, we used CADS balance
sheet item 44 (land and non-residential buildings) plus item 45 (other buildings) to proxy for
f  capital  stock,  and  item  48  (structures  and  machinery)  plus  item  51  (industrial  and
commercial equipments) to proxy for m capital stock. The main advantage of this approach
is  that  it  exploits  the  information  at  the  firm-level:  stocks  directly  refer  to  each  firm,
provided that its balance sheet is available in CADS. However, unavoidable drawbacks are
the loss of observations induced by merging SIM and CADS data (1308 firms in the m case;
and 1444 in the f case), and the impact on the results of formula (A1.1) of the accounting
rules (such as revaluations and devaluations).
A1.3 – Dummy and other control variables
In the model estimation phase, a number of additional variables can be used either to
take into account a number of company-specific characteristics, or to split the whole sample
into sub-samples of interest. The additional variables can be classified in dummy and other
control variables.
We defined dummy variables for: industry; location; type of ownership; size; share
of exported production; time; extraordinary operations; zeros in effective investment and
expected sales; credit rationing; reversibility. Note that industry, location, type of ownership,
size, share of exported production are time invariant (i.e. cannot be used in fixed-effects
panel  models);  time  dummies  are  invariant  across  individuals;  extraordinary  operations,
zeros in explanatory variables, credit rationing, and reversibility dummies vary over time
and across individuals.
Industry.  The  manufacturing  activity  is  disaggregated  into  13  branches;  for  each
branch we define a dummy variable.
Location.  There  are  four  dummies:  North-West,  North-East,  Centre  and  South-
Islands.
Type of ownership. The ownership is classified by two dummies: public (equal to 1 if
the ownership is public, zero if it is private); and spa (equal to 1 for limited companies, zero
for other types of joint-stock companies).
Size. The number of employees measures the company size. This characteristic is
time invariant because, at a first stage, we measured the per-firm average employment over
time, Li , then we classified each company in one of the following five classes: very small (Li
< 50), small (50 £ Li < 100), medium (100 £ Li < 200), large (200 £ Li < 500), very large(Li
³ 500).
Share of exported production. As for size, the average share of exported production
by firm over time, Xi , classifies companies in the following five categories: no exporters (Xi
= 0), moderate exporters (0 < Xi £ 25 per cent), medium exporters (25 per cent < Xi £ 50 per
cent), large exporters (50 per cent < Xi £ 75 per cent), prevalently exporters (Xi > 75 per
cent).
                                                          
21 In doing so, we did not adjust book values to take into account changes in the value of capital goods purchased
in the past. For alternative approaches, see the data appendices in Chirinko and Schaller (2004) and in Chatelain
and Teurlai (2001).33
Time. Time dummies classify observations along time: lt = 1 if the observation refers
to time t, zero otherwise. Therefore, lt dummies can be estimated in panel models but not in
cross-sections, and their presence allows for a degree of dependency across companies in the
panel due to collectively significant effects.
Extraordinary operations. Three dummy variables equal to 1 if the company has
been subject in t to: de-merger, business combination, and merger.
Zeros in the model’s explanatory variables. Two dummy variables, equal to 1 when
expected demand and effective lagged investment are respectively zero. Note that zeros in
the min-max range of growth in expected demand are not marked with a dummy (as we did
for demand and investment), because we interpret such result as “absence of uncertainty”.
Credit  rationing  indicator.  It  is  equal  to  1  if  the  firm  is  credit-constrained.  It  is
constructed using the answers to three questions on access to credit provided by the firms in
the SIM sample. Specifically, firms are asked whether (i) at the current market interest rate
they wish a larger amount of credit; (ii) they would be willing accept a small increase in the
interest rate charged in order to obtain more credit; (iii) they have applied for credit but have
been turned down. A company is classified as credit-constrained if, given a positive answer
to either question (i) or (ii), it also answered “yes” to question (iii).
Reversibility  indicator.  The  reversibility  of  the  installed  capital  goods  may  be
represented by an indicator based on transactions in the secondary market and on leased
investment (reverst). It is a dummy variable equal to one if in t the i
th firm purchased or sold
investment  goods  in  the  second-hand  market  or  leased  them,  zero  otherwise.  Leased
investment is considered reversible because normally, as part of the leasing contract, the
client acquires the option to return the good. As a consequence, leasing companies only
finance the purchase of goods that enjoy large second-hand markets. Given that the question
about leased investment has been dropped since the 2003 survey, reverst data are partially
unavailable for 2003 and 2004. In order to avoid a loss of information, we constructed a
second reversibility indicator (REV) at company level by collapsing annual reverst data by
firm. REV is equal to one if collapsed reverst is bigger than 1, i.e. if the firm operated for at
least two years either on the second-hand or the leasing markets during the sample period.
Alternatively,  we  imputed  missing  reverst  data  on  the  basis  of  a  probit  model  whose
regressors  are  main  dummy  variables  listed  above  (i.e.  the  same  used  in  year-by-year
regressions, see Section 3).
Cash flow, net of dividends paid. It is a no-dummy control variable. Individual data
at current prices are from CADS database: CDit = cash flow (item 9.14) minus dividends
(item 7.6). In order to obtain data at constant prices, CDit has been deflated using  st PY  (the





CF = . In
analogy with explanatory effective investment in t-1, in our model the cash flow regressor
has been scaled by lagged stock of capital.
Price-cost margin. According to Domowitz et al (1986) and Guiso and Parigi (1996
and 1999), the price-cost margin PCM, by firm and year (i.e. the firm’s profit margin on unit
price) is defined as:
Sales





where CADS is the source of all variables in the formula above. In particular, Sales is the
total value of sales in nominal terms (item 6.1); Dinventories is the change in stocks (items
6.2+6.7); Payroll is labour costs (item 6.10); Materials is the cost of intermediate inputs
(items 6.6+6.8). We then classify the i
th firm as having more or less market power in time t
depending on whether their PCMit is above or below either the median value of the firm’s
industry in time t or the median value of the firm’s industry (see also Section 5).
Openness  indicator.  The  intensity  of  competition  from  foreign  companies  is
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= = = = , where Mst and Xst are
respectively  the  value  of  the  sectoral  flows  of  import  and  export  ISTAT  foreign  trade
statistics, and Vst is the NA’s value added at factor costs. The indicator has been computed
by using in the denominator the value added at base prices and the value of production (both
at factor cost and at base prices) with no significant change in the estimates.
Labour  turnover  indicator  and  labour  flexibility  in  working  hours.  The  two
indicators are available at company-year level from the SIM dataset. The labour turnover is
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= = = =   where  Iit  and  Fit  are  respectively  the  average  number  of
incumbent  and  of  fired/retired  workers  by  company,  and  Wit  is  the  average  number  of
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= = = =  where OHit and CIGit are respectively the total number of overtime
and of CIG hours by company, and THit is the total number of hours effectively worked in
that company during t. OHit has been collected only since 1998, so that the indicator is
available over the 1998-2004 period.
A1.4 – Sample representativeness
         Table A1.1
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF FIRMS BY SIZE, INDUSTRY AND LOCATION
Population 




Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear 19.07 16.91 17.44
Chemicals, rubber and plastics 9.40 11.90 11.27
Metals, mech./elect. eng., motors, vehicles 43.74 45.24 47.87
Food, timber, furniture, paper and other 27.79 25.95 23.42
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Geographical location:
North-West 37.65 42.72 42.44
North-East 31.69 31.53 15.87
Centre 16.78 14.80 24.95
South and Islands 13.88 10.95 16.74
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
(
1) Italian  firms  with  a  size of  more  than  20  and  more  than  50  employees  in  2002  (source  ISTAT,
2005). (
2) 7,642 firm-year observations of our basic sample.35
Appendix A2: Matching investment plans and realisations
In  the  main  text,  specification  (1)  is  based  on  expectations,  for  t+1,  about
investments,  demand  and  demand  growth,  formed  on  the  basis  of  the  information  set
available  in  t.  Obviously,  if  all  plans  were  fully  carried  out,  the  use,  as  the  dependent








I 1 + ) would lead to the same estimation results outlined in previous sections.
To what extent planned and actual investments differ can be assessed on empirical
grounds.  Thanks  to the  informative  content  and  to  the  time  dimension  of  the  SIM  (see
Appendix A1.1), we are able to match investment plans made in t with the corresponding
realisations in t+1 for all those companies belonging to both t and t+1 sample datasets. Note
that matching implies losing observations because of both attrition and missing realisations
for the year 2005. Therefore, we can measure the discrepancy between nominal investments
planned for t+1 (tINVit+1) and effective investments in t+1 (INVit+1), in order to summarise













RIPR . We arbitrarily assume that a company’s plan are almost-
fully carried out if its actual investment in t+1 is within 5 percent above or below the plan it
made in t, i.e. if  % 5 1 < + it RIPR .
In  the  SIM  11,044  matching  observations,  only  9.6  per  cent  of  cases  fulfils  the
% 5 1 < + it RIPR  condition. This share is slightly lower than the one (9.8 per cent) obtained by
focusing on the 5,770 observations belonging to the estimation sample of equation (1) and














With  real  investment  data,  RIPRit+1  slightly  improves,  although  the shift  from  matching
nominal  investments  (SIM  case)  to  matching  real  investments  (equation  (1)  estimation
sample) introduces an additional source of noise due to investment price forecasting.
If we concentrate on firms’ ability to forecast their future demand by comparing
expected  demand  in  t  for  t+1  and  actual  demand  in  t+1,  the  share  of  companies  with
discrepancy, in absolute value, lower than 5 increases to 34.2 per cent in the SIM (nominal
demand) case, and to 36.5 per cent in the equation (1) estimation sample (real demand). This
fact suggests that future demand is much easier to predict than investment activity.
From a descriptive point of view, a 10 per cent share of cases in which investment
plans are almost met seems a very poor proportion, based on an arbitrary 5 per cent range
assumption about RIPRit+1. Therefore, the empirical relevance of using either planned or
actual investments to explore the investment-uncertainty relationship can be assessed by
using estimation methods: if actual and planned investments substantially differ because of
the accrual of new information from t to t+1, the choice of the investment measure on the
left-hand-side of our model will lead to different inferences (and perhaps conclusions).















  is  listed  among  the  explanatory  variables,  the  model  on  which  we  base  the
inferences of Table A2.1 is a classical dynamic panel model. In such circumstances the
conditions of absence of correlation between regressors and the error term are no longer
valid,  and  a  GMM  approach  is  necessary  to  obtain  consistent  and  efficient  parameter
estimates.
 Table A2.1
ESTIMATION BY MATCHING ACTUAL AND PREDICTED DATA 
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J test statistics 65.44 78.78 61.08 66.55 61.07
degr. of freedom 57 76 52 71 55
P-values 20.71% 39.10% 18.21% 62.74% 26.70%
Autocorrelation tests (p-values) 
3:
1
st order 1.36% 3.93% 1.20% 3.67% 4.04%
2
nd order 23.52% 55.61% 28.76% 56.57% 46.97%
a1 = a2 = a3 = 0
4
0.05% 16.72% 0.01% 9.76% 16.82%
Models’ fitting 
5 0.0711 0.3400 0.0755 0.3395 0.3486
(
1)  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998)  GMM-sys  estimates,  with  robust  standard  errors  (in  brackets),  from  an
unbalanced panel of 5,770 observations for 1,761 companies; average Ti = 3.28. (
2) Hansen (1982) over-
identifying restrictions (df) test, c
2(df). (
3) Arellano and Bond (1991) autocorrelation of residual of order p,
c
2(p). (
4) P-values of the Wald statistic testing the joint significance of demand, of uncertainty and of lagged
effective investment parameters, c
2(3). (
5) Measured as the squared sample correlation between the actual and
fitted values.37
In Table A2.1 we present results from the GMM-sys estimates (see Blundell and
Bond,  1998);  as  instruments,  we  use  lags  t-2  and  t-3  of  the  explanatory  variables.  The
robustness  of  our  findings  is  confirmed  when  Arellano  and  Bond’s  (1991)  GMM-dif
estimator is applied (results are not reported but are available upon request). In the lower
part  of  the  table  it  is  shown  that  the  estimation  results  pass  the  specification  tests
(overidentifying restrictions and second-order residual autocorrelation).
Column  (1)  in  Table  A2.1  reports  the  estimates  of  our  basic  specification (1)  in
which actual investment is used as the dependent variable. Results, if compared with those
reported in the first column of Table 1, suggest: a relevant loss of magnitude in the effect of
expected demand on actual investment, 10 per cent (but not 5) significantly different from
zero; a no longer statistically significant effect of uncertainty; and a strong significance of
the autoregressive parameter, reflecting the presence of dynamics in the actual investment
pattern. The relevance of the a3 parameter, together with a weak evidence of expected-
demand effects on actual investment (a1), explain the strong rejection of the joint constraint
a1 = a2 = a3 = 0 (p-values are reported in the corresponding line of Table A2.1).
Although these results point to the irrelevance of demand uncertainty in explaining
actual investments, one should expect that firms with higher perceived uncertainty in t, and
thus with lower investment planned in t for t+1, will end up with lower actual investment in
t+1. In order to validate this hypothesis, column (2) reports the estimation results from a




I 1 + , are added to the list of explanatory
variables of the model estimated in column (1). Results suggest that, despite the very low
share of cases in which plans are met (see above), investment plans are the main driving
force of actual investment: almost half of the investment plans made in t are embodied in
t+1 actual investments; the joint significance of the other explanatory variables - including
dynamics - vanishes (the constraint a1 = a2 = a3 = 0 is not rejected with a p-value of 16.7
per cent).
The findings from columns (1) and (2) are confirmed by substituting, in the list of the
explanatory variables, the demand expected in t for t+1 with the actual demand in t+1 (see
columns (3) and (4)). It becomes even more evident that uncertainty is irrelevant, and that
actual demand has a smaller effect because it is partly embodied in the planned investments
when they are added to the model specification in column (4).
The  inclusion  of  investment  plans  (in  columns  2  and  4)  considerably  raises  the
explanatory  power  of  models  for  effective  investments,  as  evidenced  by  the  squared
coefficient of correlation between actual and fitted values (in the bottom line of Table A2.1).
This result raises the question about the rationality of the investment plans: if the plans
embody all the information available in t on expected future demand and its uncertainty,
differences between actual and planned investments should be dictated only by news. In
order to explore this point quantitatively, we estimate the following model, which accounts
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(A2.1)38
The explanatory variables in the first line of equation (A2.1) exactly represent the
same information set available at time t and embodied by equation (1). In principle, this
information might be further exploited to reduce the forecast error; if not, the investment
plans are rational and the restrictions b1 = b2 = b3 = 0 hold.
The explanatory variables in the second line of equation (A2.1) respectively measure
the  effect  of:  investment  plans  made  in  t  for  t+1  (b4  parameter);  the  one-step-ahead
prediction errors of demand (b5 parameter). If plans are an unbiased predictor of  actual
investments, it must be b4 = 0. The constraint b5 = 0 implies that the demand forecast errors
are  not  a  significant  explanation  of  the  discrepancy  between  planned  and  realised
investments. The error term nit+1 represents the (unpredictable) news occurring from t to
t+1. Finally, the vector Zit includes the same additional control variables as equation (1).
Estimation results are reported in column (5) of Table A2.1. The parameter estimates
for  the  effects  of  expected  demand,  uncertainty  and  lagged  actual  investments  are  not
significant, either individually or jointly (the p-value of the hypothesis that b1 = b2 = b3 = 0
is equal to 16.8%). As for previous results, investment plans appear to be rational with
respect to all the relevant information available in t (the same result is obtained in a model
that excludes both investment plans and errors in forecasting demand, see Guiso and Parigi,
1999).
As  far  as  the  effect  of  errors  made  in  forecasting  demand  one-step-ahead  is
concerned, the estimate of the b5 parameter is very close to zero and not significant. This
result supports what has previously been noted: given that the discrepancy between actual
and predicted demand is considerably smaller than for investments, such forecast errors do
not affect the discrepancy between investment plans and realisations. Finally, only the b4
parameter estimate is significantly negative, suggesting that the forecast error of investments
is  negatively  driven  by  the  amplitude  of  the  plan:  the  bigger  the  plan,  the  higher  the
(negative) discrepancy between actual and planned investments.
Overall, the results of this section lead to the following two main findings.
Firstly, the evidence reported in Table A2.1 can explain the controversial sign and
the low significance of the effect of uncertainty on investments, as reported by the empirical
literature solely based on actual and accounting data.
Secondly, investments planned in t for t+1 are able to explain actual investments in
t+1 much better than the effective demand in t+1. This is despite the fact that they do not
convey any news occurring from t to t+1.
Together, these results make it evident that data from survey questionnaires provide
an  invaluable  source  of  information  for  better  explaining  companies’  behaviour  and  for
predicting  their  investment  patterns.  In  fact,  the  availability  of  plans,  expectations,  and
perceptions obtained directly from firms avoids the use of proxies based on very restrictive
models and/or assumptions that may be misleading.39
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